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Abstract
With the increasing complexity of today’s cars functional safety and
compliance guarantees are more and more di cult to obtain. Dur-
ing the life time of a vehicle the detection of malfunctioning non-
mechanical components requires meanwhile more attention than the
maintenance of its mechanical counterparts. A full fledged formal ver-
ification of the overall car is not realistic and even hard to obtain for
single non-trivial components such as assistant systems. Furthermore,
it does not support fault detection at run time. We suggest an ap-
proach towards formal safety, compliance and fault detection at run
time via an auditor. The auditor is automatically fed out of the en-
gineering and production process by a suitable abstract specification
and respective model of the car and can detect then detect violations
and faulty components.
1 Introduction
The big advantage of cars as a system compared to software is robustness.
A single spark ignition failure during an engine run is hardly ever recognized
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by the driver nor does it significantly influence the behavior of an engine.
In contrast to the robustness of an engine, a single faulty line of code in
a big piece of software typically causes undesired behavior of the overall
system. On the other hand and in contrast to software, all parts of a car
can unexpectedly break at life time. Therefore, instead of a rigid formal
verification of a car, the robustness o↵ers another possibility: the verification
of the car’s behavior with respect to an abstract specification and model at
run time. The approach is not unrealistic. Car manufactures are typically
able to predict the behavior of their cars with respect to such an abstract
model on the basis of a few hundred specification parameters. For example,
acceleration from 0 to 100 can be predicted up to an accuracy of at least 5%
already at the design time of a new car. Similarly, emission values of fuel
consumption can be predicted as well.
This motivates our approach to guarantee functional safety, compliance
and fault detection. An auditor is added to the car. It reads the run time
parameters while driving, knows the abstract model and specification of the
specific car, and may obtain further information, e.g., GPS information, by
communicating to the outside world. The auditor compares the run time
parameters with the abstract model. In case of a violation beyond the ac-
curacy of the abstract model, it can act accordingly. Online monitoring has
been already investigated previously, for example, in the context of a gear
box [5]. Also, some auditing functionality is today already build into mod-
ern cars, e.g., for engine safety, our approach is generic in the sense that
it can be applied to functional safety, compliance and fault detection, in
general. Furthermore, because it is built on top of a formal model through
engineering and manufacturing, it can even consider parameters at the level
of a specific car. Any property that can be supported by a su ciently accu-
rate abstract model can be subject to the auditor. Furthermore, while the
currently deployed auditors are hand-coded, we indicate that our auditor
approach can be actually automatically generated out of an engineering and
manufacturing process supported by an overall formal model. Because it
is automatically generated, it can even be more accurate and potentially
cheaper than today’s approaches. For example, it might be able to distin-
guish hardware from software failures at run time [4] and may consider car
specific properties such as electricity consumption.
The paper is now organized as follows: Section 2 explains how the formal
abstract model and needed input parameters can be obtained out of an
engineering and manufacturing process supported by formal methods. In
Section 3, we explain our auditor approach, where a generic auditor is fed
by the parameters and models from Section 2. The paper concludes with a
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discussion of the obtained results and its potential impact in practice.
2 Development
All car manufacturers already have a logical description of the cars they
can build, they can produce, and they want to sell. This description is
typically based on the parts of the car, including software at the same level
as the mechanical parts, and also contains key specification properties. From
the engineering process abstract models representing specific aspects of the
overall car are available as well. For our approach, we accumulate all this
information into one formal model.
Figure 1: Formal model representing all product variants over the product-
life-cycle
We propose a rigid development, manufacturing and sales process that
is build on top of a formal, consistent overall formal model representing all
eventual products. Aftersales can make use of this model at a car specific
level. The model is based on the parts of a car. Attached to parts are
attributes. Rules in form of formulas of an appropriate logic state how the
di↵erent parts can be combined to components, and eventually to products,
i.e., cars. Furthermore, constraints on attributes, assigned to components
and products further enable the fulfillment of properties beyond the bill of
material.
For example, a component may be a particular engine, that contains as
its parts a specific block, cylinder head etc. It carries as its attributes the
overall volume and number of cylinders. Together with further parts, in-
cluding a particular engine software, transmission, etc., the engine becomes
an application for a particular car. Its emission values are measured in
the respective test-stand cycle and become attributes of the application and
eventually parameters of the final abstract model.
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Typical constraints with respect to engineering, manufacturing and legal
requirements could be:
• the size of the gasoline tank of the car stays in a sound relation to its
fuel consumption and desired reachability,
• the engine software properly matches the number of cylinders of the
engine and considers the attached turbo charger, and
• the fuel consumption, and hence respective emission values, is limited
at particular state of the engine, determined, e.g., by its current load,
respectively. If all this information is in fact the basis for the overall building
process of the car, the parameters of the auditor for a particular car variant
can be automatically set during manufacturing.
A formal model representing all product variants with its attributes
comes with the big advantage that formal verification becomes available
early in the process and can be used in order to prove that all specified
rules are fulfilled. Consequently, the proof serves as a certificate for the
correctness of the formal model in terms of safety, manufacturing and com-
pliance requirements and the parameters for the auditor are automatically
extracted from the certificate. With these parameters, the auditor observes
and, hence, ensures that the correctness of the formal model is properly
implemented and kept during life time in the real car. Consequently, the
correctness of the overall system (car) is ensured over the complete life-cycle.
Furthermore, building, maintaining and automatically deriving proper-
ties of such an overall model of all car variants and its attributes provides
the opportunity to perform optimizations on the formal model with respect
to a wide range of parameters. This is not completely beyond scope of to-
day’s performance of automated reasoning tools. In [6], it is shown that the
emission class of a car can be automatically obtained out of a model of the
above form. For example, the weight of the car, one input parameter of the
emission class formula, is accurately computed in this abstract model out of
weight of the di↵erent parts of the car. It is even shown that optimization
problems, e.g., answering questions of the form “what is the cheapest car
with emission class x that contains the components y, z, . . .” can be solved
by appropriate usage of automated reasoning technology.
Although a rigid management of the product built process is a well known
topic in the engineering and manufacturing science [3], an approach based
on an overall formal model has not yet been developed. There is work on
certain aspects of a formal model build on top of bill of material for the
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product [7] but it does not consider complex constraints and attributes as
suggested here. These are needed to eventually and automatically provide
an abstract model and specification to an auditor. A first step into this
direction is described in [6].
3 Auditor
The objective of the online auditor is to monitor at runtime if all require-
ments (e.g., clean air regulations) are satisfied. To be able to do so, the car
and in particular, its components like the engine controller, have to provide
the auditor with all information that are needed to perform this real-time
compliance check (see Figure 2). The auditor has a formal model of the car
together with its specific parameters that permits it to perform this compli-
ance check, e.g., to ensure that emissions regulations and safety regulations
are satisfied. This formal model is a result of configuration information
generated in the development process (see Section 2).
OEM Safety Agency Environment
car
car
control
location
speed
gas consumption
...
auditor
external sensors
(world model)
violation/OK secure interface
Figure 2: The online auditor runs inside the car. The car provides the
auditor with real-time information that permit it to check if requirements
are satisfied. The auditor has access to external sensor data to crosscheck
and to extend the real-time information.
The idea is that the auditor computes the compliance information and
reports not only to the OEM but also during the next motor vehicle inspec-
tion if there were any violations. This report is certified to show that this
report was generated by a valid auditor. An inspection station is permitted
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to download and analyze this report, in particular also for the detection and
repair of faulty components.
Note that the auditing of the emission data could in principle be per-
formed outside of the car. For example, a car could upload all necessary
information in real-time to some cloud service. This might, however, expose
privacy relevant data to the cloud and might, moreover, require constant
Internet connectivity. Similarly, if we would store all sensor data, one could
process the data, say, at an inspection station. However, this would imply
that all data must be stored for long durations (> 2years) - which would be
too much data to store.
An online auditor does not need to store massive amounts of data nor
does it need to send data across the Internet. It has to store only mini-
mal amount of data: any violation of regulations is stored persistently until
the next motor vehicle inspection. The auditor could even be configured to
report violations immediately, e.g., to ensure that safety violations are im-
mediately addressable. The auditor will not reveal any private data during
normal operations. The auditor is the result of a formal car model, there-
fore, it can even be verified whether private data of the driver or intellectual
property of the OEM is leaked to the outside. However, if a violation of
some regulations has occurred, this information needs to be verifiable: the
location of this violation might need to be reported as well as all sensor data
relevant for proving that a violation has happened.
If a violation can be shown based on the information provided by the car,
the auditor needs to show that the sensor data was indeed been provided
by the car. Hence, we require that the car certifies all sensor data and the
auditor only accepts certified sensor data. In this way, the auditor could
formally prove to an external auditor, that a violation has happened. This
proof could also be used to provide evidence to car manufacturers to fix the
detected issues.
If a car would consistently lie to the auditor, the auditor might never
detect a violation since a good liar will, of course, appear to satisfy all re-
quirements. Since the auditor does not have any sensor itself, it cannot use
its own sensing to detect wrong sensor information. To address this issue,
we permit the auditor to read external sensor information. Note that the
use of external sensor information requires constant Internet connectivity.
The external sensors might be received from other cars but also from the
smart street sensors or some sensors from, say, an inspection station. The
external sensor information is combined to a “world model” by an external
service and certified. The world model contains real/time information and
information regarding the accuracy of this information. Contradiction be-
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tween the internal sensor data and the external sensors data will be reported
as a violation.
Note the the auditor has similarities to the monitoring functions used
in ISO26262 [1]. Monitoring functions can be used to detect errors during
operations. Any error that is detected will trigger some recovery action.
An auditor is a more general mechanism since it cannot only used to detect
errors but also monitor the compliance with various regulations. Moreover,
an auditor can be executed in an hostile environment. Besides compliance
monitoring and error detection, auditors could also be used to support the
field monitoring process [2]. Field monitoring is used to collect data about
any potential safety violation during operations. This cannot only be used
to detect issues in safety critical software but also to support proven in use
arguments.
4 Conclusions
Technical systems are highly complex and the verification that they are
functionally safe and in compliance with all applicable regulations is very
di cult to ensure using design time verification. In addition, design time
verification does not support run time fault detection. Our proposal is to
perform a continuous verification of the compliance of a technical system
with its specification at run time. This should ensure a level playing field
for all manufacturers - independent of their interpretation of legal regula-
tions. Our approach balances regulatory compliance, protection of intellec-
tual property by the manufacturer and the privacy of the users. It requires
a formal-methods supported development process by using artifact created
during the development with the auditor-based compliance checking. The
auditor protects the IP of the manufacturer by processing in real-time all
data and only keep data in case a violation of regulation was detected.
Moreover, the auditor protects the privacy of the car user. Only in case of
a violation, anonymized data may be forwarded.
We can think of a wide range of potential instances of the auditor. It may
be an external component that is only attached to the car by a regulation
authority to check compliance. It may be an external component used by
the garage for fault cause detection. It may be a permanent part of the car
and generalize the mechanisms already in place today.
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